This is the first naval battle in the bay of SALAMIS … the other 2 will follow next 4-5 days
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PREAMBULE
By the first years of the 5th century BCE, Persia, under the rule of Darius (r. 522-486 BCE), was already expanding into mainland Europe and had subjugated Thrace and Macedonia. The next objective was to quell once and for all the collection of potentially troublesome rebel states on the western border of the Empire. In 490 BCE Greek forces led by Athens met the Persians in battle at Marathon and defeated the invaders. The battle would take on mythical status amongst the Greeks, but in reality it was merely the opening overture of a long war with several other battles making up the principal acts. Angered by the humiliating defeat, Darius began to prepare a second and final push into Greece, but revolts in Egypt delayed the invasion.
Greece then, lay open to the invaders and Persian forces rampaged, but some 30 Greek city-states, however, were preparing to fight back and the Battle of Salamis would show Xerxes that Greece, or at least a large chunk of it, was far from being conquered.
The outcome of the Persian Wars would decide the fate of the eastern Mediterranean in the coming years. Would Greece spread its unique democratic culture, or would Persia simply add more lands to their already vast empire? The Persian Wars are also known as the Greco-Persian Wars. Between the years of 560 and 500 BCE, political authority changed rapidly and to quite a degree. The Near East had never seen as vast an empire as Persia had grown to be under the leadership of Cyrus the Great. The Persian Empire claimed all of Mesopotamia, and stretched from the Persian Gulf in the south, to the Caspian Sea in the North, and from present-day Pakistan to the Aegean and Black Seas.
At the same time, another culture was rising just 200 miles away, across the Aegean. This culture would grow to become what would be the Greek Empire.
In this period however, most of 'Greece' was nothing but feeble villages governed by local aristocracies, however the city-state of Athens was a leap and a bound ahead of the others, already making unprecedented changes that would lead to a revolutionary type of government: democracy. While Athens was developing democracy, Sparta, on the Peloponnese peninsula, was the most important member of this culture, as they had become the most powerful land power in Greece, and was the chief member of a large alliance of other Greek city-states that controlled the majority of southern Greece. Even with all these things going for them, compared to the empire they were about to fight, they were nothing.
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SALAMIS, THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS: THE NAVAL ENCOUNTER THAT SAVED GREECE -- AND by extension WESTERN CIVILIZATION
The Battle of Salamis was a naval battle
between the Greek city-states and Persia, fought in September, 480 BC
in the straits between Piraeus and Salamis, a small island in
the Saronic Gulf near Athens, Greece.
XERXES GOAL
After
the defeat suffered by the expedition of Darius, in 490, for the
Persian Empire the Greek issue had become the pivot around which
revolved the entire Persian foreign policy. The defeat not only
demanded a prompt repair, to be paid with the loss of credibility of
the power system of the great King, but the fledgling Athenian
maritime expansion policy posed problems of hegemony in the Aegean
basin which, especially after the suppression of the Ionian revolt in
the years before the battle of Marathon, was considered by the
Persians as their exclusive commercial and military presence.
The
death of Darius in 486 BC, had left on the shoulders of his son,
Xerxes, the responsibility to close forever all the contends with the
Greeks. Just ascended the throne, Xerxes began immediately to prepare
for a new and final military operation in Greece. Following the
advice of his uncle Artabanes, Xerxes realized that this time, he had
to resort more than a simple punitive operation; so the Persian
administration demonstrated a great organizational efficiency,
collecting from all around the Empire a veritable multitude of men,
from the most disparate ethnicities, to form a large army that was
supposed to hit Greece.The Persian Fleet
Persian light fast ship
Technically, the Persians, and especially the Phoenicians, were better seamen, but as the fleet was drawn from all parts of the Empire, the motivation and communication levels were perhaps less than their opponents who all spoke the same language and who were fighting not only for their own survival but that of their families and their way of life.
The
Persian fleet significantly outnumbered the Greeks.
BRIDGE
BUILDING TO CROSS THE HELLESPONT
Xerxes
recruited a team of bridge-builders, who cleverly decided to build
two floating bridges, one for the use of the army's troops, and a
second, downstream, which would carry the large herds of horses and
other animals across the straits. The engineers also made sure to use
thicker ropes to tie the ships together. After the ropes were pulled
taut by giant windlasses anchored to either shore, mile-long
embankments of timber, stone and packed earth were laid across the
ships' decks to form roadways.
In the weeks that it took to
assemble the floating bridges, Xerxes ordered his naval commanders to
allow grain-ships bound for Greece to pass through the Dardanelles
unharmed.
PERSIAN
PLAN
The
Persian operations plan was simple and straightforward: the great
King himself stood at the head of the army, order the construction of
a bridge over the Hellespont, began to fall along the coast of Thrace
and Thessaly backed up close to the fleet.
The Greeks decided to
block the Persian progression at the Thermopylae pass, in the Locride
Opuntia, where the Spartan King Leonidas arrived with 7,000 Hoplites,
including 300 Spartans. For its part the fleet led by Themistocles,
300 Triremes, 200 of them Athenians, placed at the Strait of
Artemisio between northern coast of Euboea and the Mainland. The
Spartans, with all Peloponnesians, were convinced that the only
solution was to withdraw behind the isthmus of Corinth in the
Peloponnese, and wait for the enemy; it was a myopic vision that
would leave in the hands of the Persians two thirds of Greece,
including Athens and Attica. Rejecting reinforcements and support to
Leonidas, Spartans condemned the maneuver to failure and marked the
fate of Leonidas and his 300 Spartans.
Xerxes Anger
Xerxes Anger
Xerxes Crossing the Hellespont at the head of his army.
The
Athenians had fled to Salamis after the Battle of Thermopylae in
August, 480 BC, while the Persians occupied and burned their city.
With defeat at Thermopylae,
the inconclusive naval battle
at Artemision, and Xerxes’
Persian army on the rampage, the Greek
city-states faced an
unprecedented attack, one which threatened their very existence. The
Greek fleet joined them there in August after the indecisive Battle
of Artemisium. The Spartans wanted to return to the Peloponnese, seal
off the Isthmus of Corinth with a wall, and prevent the Persians from
defeating them on land, but the Athenian commander Themistocles
persuaded them to remain at Salamis, arguing that a wall across the
Isthmus was pointless as long as the Persian army could be
transported and supplied by the Persian navy. His argument depended
on a particular interpretation of the oracle at Delphi, which, in
typical Delphic ambiguity, prophesized that Salamis would "bring
death to women's sons," but also that the Greeks would be saved
by a "wooden wall". Themistocles interpreted the wooden
wall as the fleet of ships, and argued that Salamis would bring death
to the Persians, not the Greeks. Furthermore some Athenians who chose
not to flee Athens, interpreted the prophecy literally, barricaded
the entrance to the Acropolis with a wooden wall, and fenced
themselves in. The wooden wall was overrun, they were all killed, and
the Acropolis was burned down by the Persians. After the retreat of
the Athenian fleet and army of towns aligned, all the cities of
Boeotia, including Thebes, were forced to open the door at the army
of the great King. After a week of marching, Xerxes finally
penetrated in Attica ready to avenge, once and for all, the honor of
his father.
The approach of the great Persian army at Athens was forced to resort to radical measures: the defenses of the city was to be excluded because at that time Athens was not surrounded by defensive walls; at the suggestion of Themistocles, by many, not only in Athens, seen as the last hope of Hellas, the entire fleet was transferred from citizenship and the islands of Salamis and Aegina, while the fleet was fielded between the island of Salamis and the coast of Attica. Only a few diehards were locked in the Acropolis, hoping to resist in a last bulwark against fortified, but Xerxes, after burning the town almost deserted, put an end to the last resistance massacring all the defenders of the fortress on the Acropolis.
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The
Greek Preparation
Themistocles
(c. 524 - c. 460 BCE) was an Athenian statesman and general
(strategos) whose emphasis on naval power and military skills were
instrumental during the Persian wars, victory in which ensured that
Greece survived its greatest ever threat.
Themistocles,
after confronting the Persians at the battle of Marathon, had not
resigned, in the years immediately following, to see fade his drawing
to give Athens a war fleet worthy of the name. According to him, this
was the only means possible to try, with real chances of winning, to
solve once and for all the problem constituted by the Persian threat.
Themistocles needed time to achieve its purpose; in Athens under the influence of Pro-aristocratic politics of Miltiades, he had to use all his oratorical skills even inventing a fake purpose. The final construction of the fleet started in fact, under the pretext of a war against the neighbouring island of Aegina: to convince their fellow citizens, Themistocles used the greed and envy for the rich Aeginate shopping, which proved a stronger Persian menace.
But Athens had an invaluable resource: the silver mines of Laurion, in which a new strand, recently discovered, had allowed the national treasure to rake in 200 talents (an attic talent was worth approximately 35 kg) of silver. To the one hundred richest citizens was granted a loan of a talent in order to build and maintain a trireme, while the other hundred talents were offered at 50 naucrarie (less affluent citizens groups), each of which would have to deal with two Triremes. So with the wealth of silver mines and an organizational structure capable of mobilising all the energy of the city, regardless of wealth, Themistocles was able to provide Athens a permanent military fleet of at least 200 Triremes.
The next step for Themistocles was trying to create an Alliance capable of withstanding the impact of the Persian giant. but the result was under the expectations. The entire North Attica Greece, except for Thespis and the loyal Audience in Boeotia, surrendered for fear, falling in the hands of the Persians. With the Aegean Islands have long been in the hands of the great King, the Confederation was composed of 31 city: Sparta, Athens, Corinth, Megara, Aegina (which eventually, in need, the Athenians Allied), Calcis and other 25 cities not militarily significants. It was with this small force that Greece awaited Xerxes.
NAVAL TACTIC
The Diekplus was an ancient Greek naval operation used to infiltrate the enemy's line-of-battle. The maneuver consisted of Greek ships, in line abreast, rowing through gaps between its enemy's ships. After the galley successfully crossed the opponent's line, the Greek ships would turn around and attack the susceptible side of the opponent Themistocles had already built a larger trireme, casting from the bow to the stern, where there were two small elements of bridge to the helmsman and the deal is done, a long catwalk, which deploy the Hoplites to keep them ready, wide, to boarding Infantry on board ships
Both sides had very similar ships - the triremes (triērēis) - which were 40-50 ton wooden warships up to 40 m long. Light, streamlined, and maneuverable, they were powered in battle by 170 oarsmen split in three ranks down each side of the ship. Able to rapidly accelerate, break, zigzag, and turn 360 degrees in just two ships’ lengths, good seamanship could place the vessel to best advantage and employ the principal strategy of naval warfare at that time which was to ram the enemy, making full use of the bronze ram fitted to the prow of the vessel.
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While the Persians were count on maneuverability of their Triremes, carrying groups of archers to target with arrows the enemy, the Greeks at Salamis adopted a more brutal tactics, seeking contact with the opposing ships, so to exploit, after the ramming, the contingents of Hoplites that can finally boarding the enemy vessels.
Sometimes on the Triremes were also installed war machines for throwing stones or heavy javelins against enemy ships.
The forces on the field
1. Contemporary
historians such as Hanson estimate in two or three hundred thousand
soldiers the force put together by Xerxes, while Delbruck estimates
an amount of the total number of combatants at the disposal of the
great King to a maximum of 75,000 men. However, an acceptable
estimate of the Persian forces can get around 200,000 combatants,
many of whom still serve on the accompanying fleet consisting of at
least 800 Triremes in addition to auxiliary ships and transports.
It was a very considerable strength, especially for the armies of the time and, in any case, much higher than that which the Hellenes were, at best, able to field: about 10,000 Hoplites to Sparta, between 7,000 and 8,000 for Athens, much less from smaller towns; the only note of optimism for the Greeks came from the great fleet put together by Themistocles that, as we said, had a substantial Athens equipped Navy.
It was a very considerable strength, especially for the armies of the time and, in any case, much higher than that which the Hellenes were, at best, able to field: about 10,000 Hoplites to Sparta, between 7,000 and 8,000 for Athens, much less from smaller towns; the only note of optimism for the Greeks came from the great fleet put together by Themistocles that, as we said, had a substantial Athens equipped Navy.
The
Persian Fleet
The Persian fleet significantly outnumbered the Greeks.
The exact number of ships in the Persian fleet is not known. Herodotus in his Histories (440-430 BCE) compiles precise lists but these are widely thought to be exaggerated and unreliable. Also, his list is for the Persian fleet which originally sailed to Greek waters and by the time of Salamis, many would have been left to guard ports and supply routes or have been lost in storms (especially at Magnesia) and in the Battle of Artemision a month earlier. Nevertheless, below are his figures for triremes - warships with three banks of oars (note the contributions from conquered or pro-Persian Greek cities):
- Phoenician 300
- Egyptian 200
- Cyprian 150
- Cilician 100
- Ionian 100
- Hellespontine 100
- Carian 70
- Aolian 60
- Lycian 50
- Pamphylian 30
- Dorian 30
- Cyclades 17
The
much larger Persian fleet consisted of 1207 ships, although their
original invasion force consisted of many more ships that had since
been lost due to storms in the Aegean Sea and at Artemisium. The
Persians, led by Xerxes I, decided to meet the Athenian fleet off the
coast of Salamis Island, and were so confident of their victory that
Xerxes set up a throne on the shore, on the slopes of Mount Aegaleus,
to watch the battle in style and record the names of commanders who
performed particularly well.
The Greek Fleet
The Greeks had 371 triremes and pentekonters (smaller fifty-oared ships), effectively under Themistocles, but nominally led by the Spartan Eurybiades. The Spartans had very few ships to contribute, but they regarded themselves the natural leaders of any joint Greek military expedition, and always insisted that the Spartan general would be given command on such occasions. There were 180 ships from Athens, 40 from Corinth, 30 from Aegina, 20 from Chalcis, 20 from Megara, 16 from Sparta, 15 from Sicyon, 10 from Epidaurus, 7 from Eretria, 7 from Ambracia, 5 from Troizen, 4 from Naxos, 3 from Leucas, 3 from Hermione, 2 from Styra, 2 from Cythnus, 2 from Ceos, 2 from Melos, one from Siphnus, one from Seriphus, and one from Croton.The allied Greek fleet was commanded by the Spartan Eurybiades, a surprising choice considering it was Athens who was the great naval power and supplied by far the most ships. The two other senior commanders were Themistocles of Athens and Adeimantus of Corinth. In effect, tactics and strategy were decided by a council of 17 commanders from each of the contributing contingents. However, it is Themistocles, the brilliant naval commander, drawing on his twenty-year experience and flush from the success of Artemision against far superior numbers, who is widely credited with deciding to hold position at Salamis instead of retreating to the isthmus of Corinth and masterminding the Greek victory.
Herodotus’ figures are once again inconsistent, his grand total of 380 triremes making up the Greek fleet is 15 more than the sum of his individual state contributions:
- Athens 200
- Corinth 40
- Aegina 30
- Megara 20
- Sparta 16
- Sicyon 15
- Epidaurus 10
- Eretria 7
- Ambracia 7
- Troezen 5
- Naxos 4
- Hermione 3
- Leucas 3
- Styra 2
- Ceos 2
- Cythnos 1
The
figures for some states are suspiciously similar to those given
before the Battle of Artemision, implausibly suggesting either they
suffered next to no losses in that conflict or a swift replacement of
vessels. Aeschylus states a total figure of 310 and Thucydides
400. In summary, we can only say that the Persian fleet seems to have
significantly outnumbered the Greek.
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THE
BATTLE
The Persians - according to more credited estimations - sided with the fleet divided into three parts: at right, at Attica bank, were the Phoenix vessels of Sidon, Tyre and Arad, under the command of the Persian Megabazo; on the left, to Salamis, the Triremes of Ionia, Caria and Ponto under Ariabigne; while the ships of Lycia, Cilicia and the rest of the Egyptian unit occupied the Center under the command of the King's half-brother Achmene.
The next morning (possibly September 28, but the exact date is unknown), the Persians were exhausted from searching for the Greeks all night, but they sailed in to the straits anyway to attack the Greek fleet. The Corinthian ships under Adeimantus immediately retreated, drawing the Persians further into the straits after them; although the Athenians later felt this was due to cowardice, the Corinthians had most likely been instructed to feign a retreat by Themistocles. Nevertheless none of the other Greek ships dared to attack, until one Greek trireme quickly rammed the lead Persian ship. At this, the rest of the Greeks joined the attack.
FLEET MOVEMENTS
The actual
details of the battle are sketchy and often contradictory between
ancient sources. Nevertheless, presenting the most commonly agreed
upon elements, the first action of the battle was the defection of
two Ionian ships to the allied Greek fleet. Themistocles, perhaps
sending messages to the pro-Persian Greek state fleets, had hoped for
more such defections but no others occurred. One such ship from Tenos
informed the Greeks that the Persians were amassing in the straits,
blocking in the Greek fleet. The Persians had moved into position
overnight, hoping to surprise the enemy, but this strategy was
unlikely to be successful considering the short distances involved
and the noise made by the rowers.
DUPLICITY
OF THEMISTOCLES
There
is also the possibility that Themistocles had sent messages to Xerxes
intimating the fragile Greek alliance was breaking up and the fleet
was about to retreat.
The
Greeks faced the enemy with Euribiade on the right with the ships of
Corinthians and lacedaemonians; Themistocles commanded the rest of
the fleet, with the vessels of Megara and Calcis on the center and on
the left, towards the coast of Attica, the homogeneous contingent of
Athenian Triremes.
The Persians were trying to force the Straits, but soon they founded themselves in a real bottle and tried to recover a minimum of alignment. Instantly the two Greek wings threw themselves on the disordered enemy formation, hitting hard the Triremes of the great King.
In the narrow space, crowded by hundreds of ships, crews and specialists at the service of the Persians were unable to put to use their superior training and their greater seaworthiness.
In
this great confusion a large number of Persian ships ended up being
rammed and, once at close range, the contingents of Hoplites embarked
on Greek Triremes were an absolutely winning weapon. Persian
soldiers, stimulated by the presence of their King, fought well, but
the tactical situation was very much in favour of the Greeks. Bottled
and unable to maneuver, the Persian Triremes fell one by one under
the blows of Greek spurs or, if addressed, suffered the attack of the
heavy infantry embarked.
Only
about 100 of the heavier Persian triremes could fit into the gulf at
a time, and each successive wave was disabled or destroyed by the
lighter Greek triremes. At least 200 Persian ships were sunk,
including one by Artemisia, who apparently switched sides in the
middle of the battle to avoid being captured and ransomed by the
Athenians. Aristides also took another small contingent of ships and
recaptured Psyttaleia, a nearby island that the Persians had occupied
a few days earlier. It is said that it was the Immortals, the elite
Persian Royal Guard, who during the battle had to evacuate to
Psyttaleia after their ships sank: they were slaughtered to a man.
According to Herodotus, the Persians suffered many more casualties
than the Greeks because the Persians did not know how to swim; one of
the Persian casualties was a brother of Xerxes. Those Persians who
survived and ended up on shore were killed by the Greeks who found
them.
CASUALTIES
Casualties
were very high: approximately 200 Persian Triremes sunk, while the
Greeks have suggested the loss of only 42 vessels. The sea was
covered with floating wreckage including sought out survivors of the
Persian crews. The Athenians, still furious for the destruction of
their city, distinguished themselves in the struggle not allowing
mercy to the Persian sailors who sought refuge among the wreckage.
Soon the battle turned into a carnage, and only a few of the Persian
ships involved in the fight were able to find refuge in the escape.
Xerxes did not see through his defeat, once again become clear that
the outcome of the battle would have been disastrous for their fleet,
he left his throne and returned, perhaps already contemplating his
return to his homeland, at the Persian camp. In the first major naval
battle in history, the tactical genius and the political acumen of
Themistocles had assured the Greek Coalition a decisive victory;
without the support of the fleet and with the supply crisis, the fate
of the Persian invasion force was now decided.
Xerxes,
sitting ashore upon his golden throne, witnessed the horror. Overlooking
from his command post in the early morning, Xerxes would have seen
not a fleet about to retreat but the Greeks positioned two-ships deep
along a 3 km long curve, perhaps presenting a line of 130 ships
against the Persian main front of 150 ships, three ships deep. The
Persians advanced, becoming more closely packed as they aligned
themselves with the enemy’s narrower front. The Greeks held
position, drawing the Persians into an ever tighter confine. Ships
began to ram each other and in the tight space they would have
struggled to disengage. Then the armed soldiers on board would have
come into their own with hoplites and archers fighting on the decks
much as in a land battle. With more Persian ships pressing in from
the rear and the Corinthians joining from the side, there must have
been a chaos of broken ships and drowning men - particularly amongst
the Persians who had no shore to retreat to and most probably could
not swim.
The
consequences
Defeated and humiliated, Xerxes was forced to take the way back home. He did so almost immediately, aware as it was, that after such a setback, his presence at the center of the Empire was required. The various parts of Persian power, in fact, couldn't stay long without the leadership of the King, especially when weakened by the defeat, the disintegration of the Empire itself was a concrete possibility.
In Greece the King left the army under the General Mardonius, with orders to spend the winter there and try to revival a terrestrial campaign the following year.
While the fleet
was in disarray towards Asia minor, King cautiously regained the
Hellespont, which he crossed after a month, with the whole army,
excluding the Persians and the Medes that Mardonius chose to keep
with him, about 50,000 fighters.
The victory of the Greeks marked the turning point in the Persian Wars. Xerxes and most of his army retreated to the Hellespont,
In truth, ALTHOUGH still dangerous, the Persian presence in the heart of Greece was doomed to failure: without supplies, the Hellenic fleet had now taken full control of the Aegean, and Mardonius was forced to accept battle. Mardonius recaptured Athens, but the Greek city-states joined together once more to fight him at the simultaneous battles of Plataea and Mycale in 479 BC, the following spring, where he was defeated and killed.
https://youtu.be/nENUmbdsAPw
The victory of the Greeks marked the turning point in the Persian Wars. Xerxes and most of his army retreated to the Hellespont,
In truth, ALTHOUGH still dangerous, the Persian presence in the heart of Greece was doomed to failure: without supplies, the Hellenic fleet had now taken full control of the Aegean, and Mardonius was forced to accept battle. Mardonius recaptured Athens, but the Greek city-states joined together once more to fight him at the simultaneous battles of Plataea and Mycale in 479 BC, the following spring, where he was defeated and killed.
https://youtu.be/nENUmbdsAPw
AftermathBecause the Battle of Salamis saved Greece from being absorbed into the Persian Empire, it essentially ensured the emergence of Western civilization as a major force in the world. Many historians have therefore ranked the Battle of Salamis as one of the most decisive military engagements of all time.
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Assessment of Themistocles
Themistocles was often viewed unfavourably by early writers. Admittedly a master strategist, he is often depicted as a slick politician, bent on enriching himself even in the crisis of the great war. The reason for this bias is perhaps that he was a strong democrat, hated by the Athenian upper classes, and their views, passed on to their friend the historian Herodotus and to Plato, himself an aristocrat, colour the whole tradition.
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NOTE ON ARTEMISIA
Artemisia I of Caria (Ancient Greek: Ἀρτεμισία; Persian: آرتمیس; fl. 480 BCE) was queen of the ancient Greek city-state of Halicarnassus and of the nearby island of Kos, within the Achaemenid satrapy of Caria, in about 480 BCE. She fought as an ally of Xerxes I, King of Persia against the independent Greek city states during the second Persian invasion of Greece. She personally commanded her contribution of five ships at the naval battle of Artemisium and in the naval Battle of Salamis in 480 BCE. She is mostly known through the writings of Herodotus, himself a native of Halicarnassus, who praises her courage and the respect in which Xerxes held her queen of the ancient Greek city-state of Halicarnassus and of the nearby island of Kos, within the Achaemenid satrapy of Caria, in about 480 BCE. She fought as an ally of Xerxes I, King of Persia against the independent Greek city states during the second Persian invasion of Greece. She personally commanded her contribution of five ships at the naval battle of Artemisium and in the naval Battle of Salamis in 480 BCE. She is mostly known through the writings of Herodotus, himself a native of Halicarnassus, who praises her courage and the respect in which Xerxes held her.
Artemisia at the battle of SALAMIS
Prior to the naval battle, she was the only
commander to criticize the plan.
Artemisia was the first and only woman admiral who commanded personally her squadron of warships.
ARTEMISIA with XERXES I
(September,
480 BCE).
Tell the King to
spare his ships and not do a naval battle because our enemies are
much stronger than us in the sea, as men are to women. And why does
he need to risk a naval battle? Athens for which he did undertake
this expedition is his and the rest of Greece too. No man can stand
against him and they who once resisted, were destroyed.If Xerxes chose not to rush into a naval encounter, but instead kept his ships close to the shore and either stayed there or moved them towards the Peloponnese, victory would be his. The Greeks can't hold out against him for very long. They will leave for their cities, because they don't have food in store on this island, as I have learned, and when our army will march against the Peloponnese they who have come from there will become worried and they will not stay here to fight to defend Athens.
Several modern ships were named after Artemisia. Iranian destroyer (Persian: ناوشکن) purchased during the Pahlavi dynasty was named Artemis in her honour. This destroyer was the largest ship in the Iranian Navy.
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